Part III: Applying Backfire Tactics in the US
The backfire model can be applied to a wide range of injustices, including harassment, threats, doxing, and physical violence. It can also be applied at various scales—the model can be helpful in thinking through community responses to large-scale events such as the January 6, 2021 insurrection at the US Capitol, as well as highly localized circumstances, such as threats by an individual against an election worker.
At the same time, the backfire model is only a tool to help people think through options. It cannot tell people what specific actions to do, what messages to use, or what demands to make in any particular case. Those decisions must be based on the details of a particular incident and the decisions of activists and community members who know those details.
However, we can begin to apply the backfire model to the problem of political violence in the US in general and share considerations for its use. Commentary on the five backfire principles and related areas (such as preparation and setting goals) is included below.
PREPARATION
A common theme in the backfire model is the importance of preparation. The model allows people to anticipate the kinds of tactics that perpetrators will use to minimize outrage, which means that people can prepare ahead of time to counter these tactics.
One aspect of preparation is getting background knowledge about political violence in general (such as in the Appendix of this guide); specific details relevant to your state and county (such as relevant laws and resources covered in Part IV); and past incidents of political violence that have happened in your community. You will also likely want to map and identify potential allies—including other community members and activists, community leaders and groups, businesses, journalists, lawyers, political officials, or members of law enforcement who could potentially be helpful under some circumstances at preventing PV or fostering backfire.
Another aspect of backfire is finding other people with whom you can organize. Even when a group is small, it can be much more powerful than acting alone. It is beyond the scope of this guide to discuss various aspects of forming a group, but talking with your own friends, neighbors, colleagues, or acquaintances, and building out from there, is a simple way to begin.³¹
In addition, since community mobilization is a key part of backfire, it can help to offer people proactive training on the backfire model and action planning. Mobilization is more effective when it is well-organized, so setting a code of conduct for possible public actions such as protests can also be established as part of a group agreement. For reasons we will detail subsequently, a commitment to nonviolent means is essential to ensuring that your responses to political violence do not end up backfiring against your own group.
To manage the process of preparation and potential future mobilization, you may also want to establish a division of labor within your group. Some possible roles include:
Researcher – Obtains specific background knowledge about laws, institutions, political violence, and available resources to support backfire.
Messaging and Communications Lead – Develops messaging and communications, and distributes talking points when needed.
Liaison Relationship Builder – Identifies potential allies and conducts outreach to them, or delegates the task of outreach in cases when another group member has a better connection.
Press Liaison and Spokesperson – Builds connections with journalists, is the point of contact for media inquiries, and is the default spokesperson (although maximizing backfire may require different spokespersons at different times, depending on the details of a specific incident and particular audiences that may need to be reached).
Recruitment and Training Lead – Recruits and trains new members.
Action Planning Lead – Leads planning efforts for actions that involve community mobilization.
Early Warning Lead – Tracks social media and other channels to determine likely targets and timing for threats of PV.
You will also want to consider whether your group will have a particular focus. For example, will you get involved in trying to make any case of political violence backfire, or will you focus primarily on a particular geographic region or a certain kind of victim (such as election workers, specific community members or groups, or people who hold certain political leanings)? Threats of political violence are targeted at individuals from both major political parties, and perpetrators aim to silence moderate and independent voices so that hardliners prevail. So for example, if your group has strong political leanings in one direction, would your group take action, and what kind of action might you take, if someone with very different political leanings (e.g., in a different political party) were threatened?
Lastly, when political violence seems likely to happen soon—or right after it takes place—your group may also want to quickly engage in a scenario planning exercise, before you take any public action. Doing this involves brainstorming how the perpetrators will use five methods to inhibit outrage, as well as how your group can use the five backfire principles to counter them. Alternatively, you may want to create a simulation where one part of your group plays the role of the perpetrators and other people are assigned to different roles (i.e., community organizations) to game out a few different backfire scenarios.
All of these preparations and organizing will make your efforts more effective, and if you communicate some of them publicly, they may also have a deterrent effect on PV itself. Potential perpetrators may hesitate if they realize they are facing a team that is well-prepared to ensure that they will pay a cost for any abuse.
SETTING GOALS
If you develop a backfire campaign against PV, what goals should you have and what public demands should you make? The backfire model says little about these important topics, because they are based on a number of factors that will vary depending on particular circumstances.
Some of your goals may be based on building capacities within your group—for example, you could set a goal that you will increase your number of trained supporters by 50 percent over the next month.
Other goals may be more directly tied to creating backfire in a particular incident. For example, in response to recent acts of property destruction meant to intimidate political officials in this city, we will register 20,000 new voters prior to the voter registration deadline for our upcoming election. We will raise $20,000 for candidate A in response to incitement of threats against them. We will publish five stories (articles, op-eds, letters to the editor) in local news sources this month that advance the five backfire principles. We will develop a coalition of at least three community groups from various political backgrounds to take a public stand against PV within the next two weeks.
Your group may also choose to issue certain demands—clear and direct requests of specific powerholders. For example, we demand that all police chiefs in our county commit to conducting political violence awareness and response training among their officers by the end of 2024. We demand that the state legislature appropriate $10 million to increase investigatory capacity toward threats of PV by the end of the current legislative session. We demand that Congressman B issue a statement within the next 24 hours clearly denouncing incitement to PV by his supporters. We demand that the following major donors to Congressman C publicly state they will discontinue their contributions to him based on his support of political violence, or else we will call for boycotts of their businesses within one week.
How do you know which goals to set and which demands to issue? Two guidelines may be helpful here.
First, listen to those who have been targeted by PV, those who are impacted, and those who are in positions of power to do something about the problem. Ask them what they need. Maybe they are afraid to speak out publicly, but they encourage you to speak on their behalf. Maybe there are pieces of legislation or goals that they want to advance, but they cannot advocate for them in their current position.³² Maybe they are seeking allies or resources that your group can connect them with? Or maybe they want to play an integral role in developing a response to the particular incident affecting them? You won’t know until you develop trust with them and ask what they need. Their responses do not need to dictate your actions, but it is important to consider them.
Second, seek to build power among those who oppose PV. This is one of the great advantages that community responses have over government responses. Governments can try to prevent political violence, or to prosecute those who break a law. But government responses generally do not strengthen those targeted by PV, or directly counter the political aims of the perpetrators. In contrast, community responses do not face these limitations. For example, if a particular candidate is targeted with threats, a community can respond by holding fundraisers and volunteering to work for the threatened candidate. This kind of response ensures that when political violence is used, it results in greater organization and empowerment of the community and strengthens the target, which runs directly against the political goals of the perpetrators.
In this regard, the five principles of backfire are an empowering mix of defense and offense. They aim to simultaneously block the agenda of the perpetrators and to strengthen those who oppose them. Further considerations on applying these five principles are below.
Principle 1: Reveal
Physical political violence is generally difficult to cover up, and therefore easy to reveal.
However, threats and other forms of PV are often much easier to cover up, especially because victims may fear reporting threats, and threat-makers may remain anonymous. Moreover, even when threats are publicly revealed, they tend to receive much less public attention than physical political violence. This is why threats and other forms of intimidation are so widely used and have done so much damage to our democracy. They usually don’t backfire by themselves—it takes extra work by community members to make them costly for perpetrators. Perpetrators are also well aware of this, which is why most avoid committing actual physical political violence.
“Online harassment, threatening phone calls, or repeated notes in a mailbox are not the same as a brick through a window, but they can have a similar psychological effect.”
Another factor to consider is that once political violence of any kind—whether a threat or a physical act—is revealed, how do you address the risk that exposing it could amplify its negative effects, and thus lead to greater fear and demobilization by the public?
There is no single answer to this question, but there are some considerations. First, you can make contact with the victim of political violence, listen to their needs, and seek their consent to make details of their incident public. Find out if they are willing to speak about the incident, or provide specific evidence of the incident (i.e., photographs or video, a copy of a threatening email, social media post, recorded message, or a letter sent in the mail).
Second, if you choose to try to make an incident of political violence backfire, reveal it publicly in the time, place, and manner that is most advantageous for your goals. Plan your message ahead of time. Think through who should speak about the incident (speakers may be based in part on who can generate attention and be seen as credible by various audiences). Sharing specific details and visual evidence may help it get more media attention.
To mitigate fear that may result from exposure to incidents of PV, details of those incidents can be accompanied by public messages that show resilience, strength, and determination, such as:
The community is strongly resolved to stand up to bullying.
The community rejects the use of political violence against anyone, including those who we may disagree with.
There is safety in numbers—the vast majority of people oppose PV, while only a very small minority support it.
Those who oppose political violence are united, organized, and have a plan.
Those who oppose political violence are prepared to take action to counter it, and here are some actions that community members can take to do so….
There are many ways for community members to contribute to countering political violence, including lower risk options.
The law is on our side.
The stakes of this fight are not just about an individual, they are about determining the kind of society we live in—a democracy that advances toward greater rights and freedom, or an authoritarian society in which fear and violence are allowed to dictate people’s public and personal decisions.
These messages can be communicated not just through words, but also by images and actions, such as by showing diverse community members standing together, or launching other public actions that show strength, courage, and unity (examples of several real actions that have been carried out are listed under Principle 4: Redirect).
Principle 2: Redeem
Perpetrators often viciously attempt to devalue those they abuse. This is a particularly damaging practice when amplified by social media. Moreover, perpetrators may feel no need to adhere to facts in their attempts to devalue the victim—they may develop and propagate blatant falsehoods.
Yet the messaging advantage can be with those who oppose political violence, if they are organized and able to use it. There is a much larger audience of people who are receptive to the idea that political violence is wrong, although reaching this audience takes work. Some options to consider in redeeming those targeted with political violence include:
Use of surrogates
Finding a range of people who are well-respected or have shared identities with different segments of the broader community and who are willing to speak about the incident can humanize a person who was victimized. In general, the closer a speaker is to the community, the better (this means that getting trusted local leaders to speak can sometimes have more impact than getting state or national leaders). In addition, getting someone with high visibility—a political leader, a celebrity—to take a stand and generate attention can be helpful.
Appearance
Think intentionally about the appearance and images of the person who was victimized as well as those who stand with them or speak about them. Should they wear more formal dress or play to the idea of high status? Should they wear casual dress and convey approachability and neighborliness? If uniformed professionals (i.e., doctors, nurses, police) appear alongside them, do they wear their uniforms? There is no single right answer to the question of appearance, but when attempts are made to devalue the victim, it is important to think of the range of attacks that may come and to think of the range of options to counter them in word, deed, and image.
Conduct
How does the victim act? What is their demeanor? Do they express sadness, anger, resolve, calmness, or outrage? Are they prepared to respond in a disciplined way to provocations that may be directed at them in ensuing days and weeks?
Values
Are there widely shared values or identities among members of the audience that the victim can appeal to through speech, symbols, or actions?
In addition, when devaluing attacks come, it is also important to consider options for response. For example, scholar Brian Martin outlines four possibilities:
Ignore the attacks
You may ignore an attack if you think it is not widely circulated (such as a single social media post that gets little traction) or will be seen as absurd and not credible. Yet how do you know if the attack will be deemed credible or not? Some things to consider are whether the attack builds on pre-existing attitudes in the community, how often it is repeated, and whether some in the community believe the attack comes from an authoritative source. When a claim confirms people’s pre-existing biases, is frequently repeated, or comes from a source that some people respect, they are more likely to believe the claim, even when it is false.
Make a rational, factual response
You can choose to respond to an attack with clear logic and evidence, such as documents and testimonials. When you can factually rebut the attack and produce evidence to support your claims, independent journalists in particular may be more likely to be swayed by your response.
Counterattack
Refuting the attack briefly and clearly, and then pivoting to a counterattack is also an option. Counterattacks are generally more effective when they call into question the ulterior motives of the perpetrators. In this way, they name the game that perpetrators are playing and show how perpetrators are cynically trying to manipulate public opinion. Advance research on perpetrators can help sharpen counterattacks and quicken your reaction time. To maintain your own credibility and prevent possible claims against you, it is essential that counterattacks be grounded in facts.
Use humor
You can mock the attack. This option can be more powerful than some assume. Mocking an attack can show that the attack should not be taken seriously, highlights the absurdity of the perpetrators’ actions, and communicates that you are not afraid. For example, many politicians counter or deflect criticism by using humor in their political advertising. The same principle can apply in backfire.³³
Deciding which approach to use depends on the circumstance. To help you determine specific options in a situation, you might split a group of supporters into three subgroups. Each subgroup is then tasked with developing a response to an attack either factually, through counterattack, or humor, and then you compare which response seems most effective or combine some aspects of each. Alternatively, you may determine that no response at all might be your best option.
Principle 3: Reframe
As inciters, threat-makers, and enactors of political violence attempt to devalue their victims, they also simultaneously reinterpret events.³⁴ For example, they may attempt to downplay the damage done, such as when some claimed that the crowd at the January 6, 2021 insurrection at the US Capitol was not that violent. They may further reinterpret political violence as virtuous, for example by referring to violent individuals as “patriots,” or by referring to those convicted of violent acts as “political prisoners” or “hostages.” Another variation of this is to claim that perpetrators were justified in using violence under self-defense or “stand-your-ground” laws.
Those who incite PV may simultaneously try to deflect blame from themselves by distancing themselves from specific events—for example, by claiming that those responsible were a small group of individuals, rather than part of a broader problem of political violence that inciters contribute to. Some inciters may also try to reinterpret events by claiming that any violence was actually a result of actions from the other side (for example, falsely asserting that the anti-fascist group Antifa instigated violence at the US Capitol on January 6, 2021).
These claims may seem laughable, especially in the face of widely witnessed and obvious incidents. But when the claims are repeated often enough, they have an effect, so they must be countered consistently.
Reframing is the opportunity to do so. Redeeming is about validating the victim. Reframing then casts that victim, the perpetrator(s), acts of political violence, the damage done by those acts, and the broader context into a coherent narrative. This narrative raises the meaning and significance of events, articulates the need for a response, builds your base of support, isolates the perpetrators, and conveys legitimacy on a community’s demands as well as subsequent actions to counter political violence.
However, not all acts of political violence are easy to reframe. The damage done by physical violence tends to be easier to communicate. But the damage done by threats is often harder to communicate, because threats do not always leave visual signs. In fact, no physical violence at all needs to be done to have a major impact. The damage of threats alone has numerous components—such as fear, psychological symptoms, monetary costs, and other effects, as outlined in the Appendix.
In addition, the damage done by all forms of political violence is not just to the individual, but to society as a whole. Targeted individuals are often portrayed as the only victims, but every onlooker who feels fear is also affected. These effects accumulate over time and democracy is undermined in the process. Communicating this can be a challenge, but the growth of research and polling data on PV (some of which is cited in the Appendix) in recent years allows this case to be made effectively.
Addressing the question of who is responsible for an incident of political violence is also an important part of reframing. Inciters create enabling conditions for political violence, yet so often they are then allowed to distance themselves from its impacts and deny their role in the process. They also often face little or no legal accountability. Therefore, you may want to develop narratives that connect inciters to threat-makers and enactors, and show the damage that they do collectively to individuals and our society.
Communicating these points can be part of reframing. The Appendix in this guide offers data and research to help you do so.
CONSIDERING DIFFERENT AUDIENCES
Narratives build on facts and data and connect them to tell a story. They are designed to reach different audiences and impact attitudes and behaviors.
This raises the question of what groups you prioritize reaching with your narrative(s), and how you want to reach them. One way to consider this is for you to identify five categories of audiences:
Active Allies
Those who are currently actively engaged in countering political violence.
Passive Allies
Those who are opposed to political violence, but are currently taking little or no action to counter it.
Neutral Groups
Groups that are unaligned or unengaged on this issue.
Passive Opposition
Those who support or enable people who perpetrate political violence, but don’t actually engage in incitement or political violence themselves.
Active Opposition
Those who currently actively engage in incitement or political violence.³⁵
The largest group among those five categories is passive allies. Developing a narrative that can activate and engage them is a major part of making political violence backfire. Using language, symbols, and messengers that resonate with them can increase your impact. Even if they only take small actions, like making a small political contribution, displaying a symbol, or committing to voting only for candidates that don’t support or enable political violence, the sheer number of individuals taking these small actions is incredibly powerful.
Your narrative may also seek to motivate your active allies, nudge neutral groups and fence-sitters to express their opposition to political violence, or seek to shift passive opposition to become more neutral. If you accomplish these goals, you continue to build your strength and isolate those who actively oppose you.
Some may argue that it is also important to try to depolarize politics by trying to shift the opinions of members of your active opposition. However, attempting to do so is often not the best use of time and energy in a backfire campaign, nor is it necessary in order to change their behavior. If those who actively oppose you recognize that they lose support every time they engage in political violence, many will realize that they need to shift their activities, even if they have not had a change of heart.³⁶
ENSURING THAT YOUR NARRATIVE DOES NOT BACKFIRE AGAINST YOU
As stated above, backfire can be accomplished by moving a variety of groups closer to your side. However, not all narratives are equally effective at doing this, and some narratives and actions you take could even backfire against you. Political violence can evoke strong emotions, like fear or hatred, among targeted groups. When these emotions predominate in the resulting narrative, you may express outrage but primarily speak only to your own group of active supporters, while estranging passive allies, driving passive opponents to become more active, and reinvigorating already-active opponents.
“Amid the deep grief, fear, division, and anger that characterize this moment, our words matter more than ever. It is easy to feel that in moments of intense emotion and high stakes—such as this one—exceptions or justifications can be made. It is in fact just the opposite.... These moments mandate that we take the strongest care to use our words responsibly, and to proactively address communication that paves the way for violence.”
Fortunately, this possibility can be minimized. To ensure that your narrative doesn’t backfire against you, it’s important to understand the rhetorical strategies of those who incite political violence. You can then develop a narrative that weakens, rather than reinforces, theirs. There are numerous studies of extremist rhetoric, and the organization Over Zero has prepared a useful overview of core points of political violence narratives.³⁷ Key elements of these narratives include:
The identification and dehumanization of a group that is deemed a threat.
Creation of a clear unifying identity of people who are being threatened by the dehumanized group.
The assignment of collective responsibility for the threat to all members of the dehumanized group. The assertion that no one who is part of the dehumanized group is innocent.
Casting one’s own side as victims of the other, threatening group. This can even happen when one’s own side controls many formal levers of political and economic power.
Escalation of the threat to existential proportions—instead of a rhetoric of “us versus them” (which you can have in a democracy, and which can be resolved through regular elections or the legal system), the rhetoric of political violence becomes about “us OR them.” Mutual coexistence is deemed impossible. This effectively eliminates the opportunity for compromise, provides a justification to overturn democratic outcomes that extremists do not like, and marginalizes moderates who may question violent rhetoric or aim to build bridges to the other side.
The elevation of violence as the means by which conflict must be prosecuted. Violence is framed as heroic, patriotic, strong, and necessary to protect one’s own community, family, and identity. It is also portrayed as a pathway to a better future. In this way, normal taboos about using violence are overridden because violence is argued to be necessary in order to protect one’s loved ones and to advance a higher cause. This enables people simultaneously to perpetrate violence, claim victimhood, and feel that they are morally upstanding in spite of their own actions.
It's important to note that these elements of violent extremist rhetoric do not need to be true in order to be believed. Threats can be fabricated. The idea of an existentially threatening “other” group can be imaginary. Inciters may be well aware of this and not believe everything they say. However, their listeners and followers, who may make threats and enact political violence, may believe this rhetoric fully. Inciters then continue to frame political differences in existential terms in order to keep their listeners and followers scared and engaged. This may include outlandish claims that are believed by their followers but sound ridiculous to others. It seems absurd that a highly armed man can cast himself as a victim while violently threatening an unarmed protester. Yet the threat-maker may actually believe that he, himself, is the one who is most threatened.
“It is easy to feel that in moments of intense emotion and high stakes—such as this one—exceptions or justifications can be made. It is in fact just the opposite.... These moments mandate that we take the strongest care to use our words responsibly, and to proactively address communication that paves the way for violence.”
— Over Zero, "A Refresher on Narratives & Violence"
Understanding this rhetorical strategy allows you to develop narratives that effectively counter political violence, rather than reinforce it. Over Zero offers several suggestions in this regard. First, they emphasize the importance of intentionality and tone in setting a narrative, stating:
Words make worlds. Amid the deep grief, fear, division, and anger that characterize this moment, our words matter more than ever. It is easy to feel that in moments of intense emotion and high stakes—such as this one—exceptions or justifications can be made. It is in fact just the opposite. In these moments our words can most directly lead to further violence. These moments mandate that we take the strongest care to use our words responsibly, and to proactively address communication that paves the way for violence.³⁸
They then provide a number of options for countering such rhetoric, some of which are included below alongside additional commentary:
Avoid dehumanizing other groups directly or in metaphor.
Do not frame an entire other group as a threat. Focus instead on the specific threatening actions of specific people.
“Undermine ideas about groups sharing an essence or being all the same….” Highlight the diversity within your group, to counter dehumanizing rhetoric. If someone in your group does something that merits public criticism, you may criticize the individual and simultaneously point out that this person’s actions do not represent your entire group.
Create a narrow “them” (focusing on specific individual behaviors) and make a broad “us” that includes a wide range of people opposed to political violence.
To counter the “us OR them” mindset of violent groups, “consider highlighting all groups’ mutual interdependence, that our futures, safety, and security are bound up with one another.”
“Bolster identities that cut across dividing lines (‘cross-cutting identities’)…. These identities can be local community identities, shared interests (sports), common experiences (motherhood),” shared professional identities, or shared histories and experiences.
Develop unifying identities that “don’t require your audience to lose their existing ones: It is much easier to build a new identity than it is to abandon an existing one (for instance, ‘Boston Strong’ following the Boston Marathon bombing).”
“Build and maintain strong social norms against dangerous rhetoric and violence: Show that most people within your group or community disapprove of violence and division and want a different path forward.”
“Showcase and celebrate helping actions or different groups working together… to grieve losses, reject violence, and work for peace. Stories and images are powerful in part because they act as ‘social proof,’ or evidence, and help to establish or reinforce positive norms. These stories can model the larger ‘we’ and can undermine negative perceptions between groups.”
“Showcase targeted groups’ warmth (compassion, caring for others) and competence (complex emotions, responsibility)…. One way to bolster a perception of a group being ‘warm’ is to showcase members’ positive intentions or helpful, altruistic, and care-taking actions towards the larger community.”³⁹
“To be a patriot is to seek truth and promote nonviolence.”
— Barbara McQuade, former U.S. attorney
Incorporating the above aspects into your narrative and reframing efforts can be challenging. When your group is being dehumanized and threatened, it is sometimes easier to fall into dehumanizing and framing another group as a categorical threat. Yet this kind of narrative can play into the hands of inciters and work against you. Certain actions can have this effect as well. For example, choosing to carry guns for protection from politically violent groups can provide a powerful visual image that these groups can use to inflame their base and feed into rhetoric of an existential threat that justifies their violent response.
Principle 4: Redirect
The backfire model has been applied in many cases where government is complicit in abuse and institutional processes serve (deliberately or inadvertently) to inhibit outrage. Yet in the case of countering political violence in the US right now, government may at times be an ally and institutional processes (e.g., criminal prosecutions, civil claims of defamation, the legislative process, and elections) all have significant and at times constructive roles to play.
This potential for alignment with government in countering some cases of political violence is an opportunity that we will discuss further. However, it is also important to remember that even with a friendly or allied government, focusing on public mobilization to counter political violence remains centrally important, and relying primarily on institutional processes to deliver justice may inhibit public mobilization and backfire. Here are some reasons why:
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
In Congress and state legislatures, legislative efforts may fail on a wide variety of matters, even when they are supported by a large majority of the population. This is often due to undemocratic features of the American political system (i.e., gerrymandering and an abundance of special interest money at all levels, as well as the presence of the filibuster and apportionment of US senators at the federal level), and such defeats can lead to demobilization.
The Judicial System
Court cases can meander for long periods of time before a conclusive result. Judicial outcomes themselves may be heavily influenced by the personal views of judges, or by legal technicalities that are little-understood by the public and may have little to do with the gravity of the alleged crime. In criminal trials, prosecutions of political violence may also emphasize incidents that increase fear in the general population, and thus help to achieve the aims of the perpetrators. In civil litigation, defamation cases may be settled outside of court, under terms that never require the defendant to recant false claims or take responsibility for their actions.
Independent Investigations
Independent investigations and other government oversight mechanisms (e.g., legislative hearings or appointed commissions) may take a long time to yield results, and recommendations from investigations may never be implemented.
Elections
Elections may provide a better institutional option for channeling popular mobilization, but many undemocratic features of our political system also affect election outcomes (including voter suppression, gerrymandering, money in politics, and domination by the two major political parties). Candidates also may make compromises that disappoint members of their grassroots base, which can shift some supporters from enthusiasm to demobilization.
None of these challenges mean that groups should disengage with government or renounce institutional processes to counter political violence. However, they should not over-rely on these options and should ensure that efforts are also (re)directed toward increasing public mobilization to achieve goals.
Yet how do groups navigate the tension between public mobilization and these institutional processes? There is no single answer—it depends on specific circumstances. Scholar Brian Martin lays out a number of options (which are listed with slight modifications below) for grassroots groups to consider regarding institutional processes, including:
Participate in the process.
Push for a better process.
Monitor the process.
Ignore the process.
Try to discredit or disrupt the process.
Develop and carry out your own parallel process.
Use the process as a mobilizing opportunity.⁴⁰
These options are not all mutually exclusive, and option 7, “use the process as a mobilizing opportunity” serves as a compass to help chart the path forward. Demanding an institutional process, or demanding an improvement in a process, can sometimes be an opportunity to mobilize people. Similarly, rallying for or against a process, having members participate in or observe the process, and providing public education (e.g., a running commentary) about the process can all be opportunities for community engagement. Lastly, supporting implementation of the results of the process can provide a basis for community mobilization.
It's also critical to remember that community mobilization does not necessarily depend on institutional processes to have an impact. Groups can organize and advance many goals—such as increasing their own grassroots base and organizing capacity; supporting victims of political violence; and increasing social, political, or economic pressure on various perpetrators—without relying on government action.
Examples of Actions to Promote Backfire
Below are examples of actions that may be part of a backfire campaign. Some groups in the US are already engaged in a number of these activities. Each can be an opportunity to build power and to weaken those who incite, threaten, or perpetrate PV. Collectively, they can help change cost-benefit calculations of those who engage in political violence.
Supporting Victims of PV, and Strengthening Advocates to Counter PV
Meeting with victims to hear their stories and support them in documenting and reporting threats.
Offering formal or informal psychological support.⁴¹
Offering affordable or pro bono legal support (for example, through efforts such as the Movement Law Lab or Community Justice Project).
Advocating on behalf of victims to legislators and law enforcement agencies to take proper action.
Holding community training sessions on how to be a “first responder” if you encounter threats or political violence.
Raising funds to support targeted individuals (e.g., activists, journalists, civil servants, political candidates) and institutions (e.g., advocacy organizations, religious groups, businesses).
Volunteering for political campaigns.
Supporting election turnout by registering voters and volunteering for get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts.
Recruiting more candidates who oppose political violence to run for public office.
Seeking pledges from public officials to stand and take action against political violence.
Proactively distributing and promoting positive and accurate information to counter disinformation campaigns.⁴²
Imposing Costs on Perpetrators of PV
Many of the actions listed above both build power among those who stand for democracy and impose indirect costs on perpetrators of political violence. In addition, costs can also be imposed directly on perpetrators themselves. However, this can sometimes be complicated since perpetrators are not always known, nor are they necessarily local. Threats may emerge from far outside of a community—from people in different parts of the country, through automated or AI systems, or even internationally. In addition, inciters, threat-makers, and enactors occupy different positions, and some may be more or less susceptible to different forms of pressure. Regardless, some possible activities to impose direct costs include:
Political pressure through public community mobilizations against political violence, and recall election campaigns against certain public officials.
Social pressure, through widespread display of symbols, statements by respected leaders, and advertisements opposing political violence.
Economic pressure (e.g., calling for boycotts) on individuals and groups, as well as the platforms and advertisers that may support them.
Links to some real cases of community mobilization against alleged activities or engagement with designated hate, extremist, or PV groups can be found in the following articles:
“German neo-Nazis tricked into fundraising for anti-Nazi charity”⁴³
“Oklahoma official with white nationalist ties is ousted in recall vote”⁴⁶
Designing Campaigns, Strategies, and Tactics
The examples linked above all embody a combination of local circumstances and key strategic and tactical principles. Each community and incident is unique, but several strategic and tactical principles can apply in many contexts. These are listed below.
Have a Nonviolent Code of Conduct
Successful tactics involve mobilization and organization. A significant part of organization involves establishing a code of conduct.⁴⁹ To make political violence backfire, and to increase the overall safety of those mobilizing, it is very important that this code requires people to be nonviolent in their activism.
As a baseline, “nonviolent” means people commit in their political mobilization to no acts of physical violence, no threats of physical violence, and no carrying of weapons. This is important for a number of reasons, including increasing overall safety, undercutting the “us OR them” rhetoric of perpetrators of political violence, keeping the focus directly on PV and those who threaten it, and appealing to the maximum number of onlookers to shift toward your side (we address some of these points further in Principle 5: Resist).
Acts of property destruction and degrading (even if not overtly threatening) language are also generally counterproductive in any public mobilizations against PV. Such acts risk all of the dynamics of violence, and they also allow perpetrators to change the topic from their indefensible behavior to the idea that activists opposed to PV are a threat to public order. Some journalists may also oblige a false equivalence between perpetrators of PV and those who behave aggressively and destroy property in response.
Research shows that when a group is seen to engage in violence or rioting, existing strong supporters may remain with that group but large segments of the population, including many other potential supporters and neutral groups, shift their attitudes away.⁵⁰ Thus, violence and rioting tend to put a cap on a group’s base of support and significantly limit its potential to grow. In some cases, a group does not realize how much it has curtailed its ability to be effective, because it is only in contact with existing strong supporters and never hears feedback from alienated potential allies or prospective recruits.
In contrast to the above, research has also shown that nonviolent mobilization tends to have the opposite effect of violence, and instead provides an opportunity to increase the support base and mobilization for one’s cause.⁵¹
Your code of conduct may cover other matters as well, for example, including specific aspects of the time, place, and manner of mobilization. People may be asked to sign a written pledge to this effect. Groups may also want to offer advance or mandatory training based on the code of conduct. For individuals who want to be supportive but cannot commit to remaining nonviolent in public and political activities, finding other support roles for them that do not risk provoked violent outbursts enable them to stay engaged with little risk to the campaign.
Offering Diverse Options for Engagement
The large percentage of Americans that oppose political violence come from a wide range of backgrounds. Some have time, energy, various resources, activism experience, high risk tolerance, and a desire to mobilize. Others may have fewer of these attributes, but their contributions can still be highly important. For this reason, effective organizers often develop diverse options for engagement, which enable people with various degrees of free time, risk tolerance, and organizing experience to all meaningfully contribute.
Such options for engagement may include public protests; consumer boycotts (in which many individuals can anonymously participate); teach-ins, artistic forms of resistance; creative actions that reinforce social norms of inclusion, kindness, and resolving differences without violence; and providing support to victims of political violence.
Establishing a range of support roles can also enable people to contribute their diverse skills. These roles may include action organizers, trainers, researchers, logistical planners, providers of legal aid, community builders, fundraisers, graphic designers, social media monitoring and support, and other functions.
Creating Dilemmas for Your Adversaries
Several cases of community mobilization linked to earlier in this section put targeted individuals and groups in a dilemma, where any response by them, or no response at all, undercuts their support. “Dilemma actions” like these are based on particular cultural, political, and societal circumstances, but they also contain some common elements that can be planned in advance.⁵² Some of these elements include:
Focusing on instances where individuals or groups are violating or acting hypocritically toward widely shared cultural, religious, civic, or societal values.
Drawing on widely shared values to justify your own actions and to draw a sharp contrast with those who oppose you.
Invoking humor, fun, and/or a festive atmosphere.
Including a constructive, positive, or service-oriented element to your actions.
Being prepared for media coverage, which sometimes means including a distinctive visual element, being prepared to speak to the press, and preparing your own supporters to propagate your actions online.
Engaging in actions that keep the focus squarely on injustice and do not allow perpetrators and their allies to easily change the subject and allege transgressions by your group.
These guidelines can help you think carefully through options for action. It is important to consider a variety of action scenarios to determine which may be best for your circumstances. In addition, it is notable that there is no formula for the perfect dilemma action. Not all actions contain all of the above qualities, and some of these qualities will not fit certain contexts. For example, the Nashville lunch counter sit-ins in 1960 were a highly effective dilemma action against the Jim Crow system in that city, but they were a solemn, rather than festive, public tactic. On the other hand, once activists were arrested and in jail, they sang songs and intentionally kept an outwardly positive demeanor. Notably, significant preparation went into all aspects of this campaign.⁵³
Tactical Innovation
In any conflict, each side learns from the other. If one side becomes too predictable, the other side adapts and learns to effectively respond. In addition, repetition of the same kinds of actions can also decrease enthusiasm among your supporters.
For these reasons, it is important to think through different options and to be innovative. Protests are just one option, and even among protests, there are many different kinds. You can cause PV to backfire by using a range of creative actions that generate social, political, or economic pressure. Some tactics may be targeted at your opponents. Others may be an appeal to your allies. And some tactics may be a combination of both.
Moving Toward Campaigns
Tactics are the most visible aspects of organizing, but even a brilliant tactic by itself is generally not adequate to create change. Instead, change comes from sequences of tactics over time that build toward a shared goal. These sequences are called “campaigns.”
Choosing a campaign goal helps you to select mutually reinforcing tactics that make a significant cumulative impact. It can also help you assess how various resources might be deployed over time to support your efforts. Your backfire campaign may be visualized as follows:
Implementing campaigns is one of the most important (yet often overlooked) aspects of effective organizing. One study concluded that when nonviolent protesters were violently attacked, the presence of a broader campaign was a major factor in determining whether the violence backfired.⁵⁴ In contrast, when violence was used against isolated nonviolent protests that were unconnected to any campaign, backfire was much less likely. The researchers found that in the cases they examined, 85 percent of instances of increased mobilization following repression happened when a protest was connected to a campaign.⁵⁵
In addition, the organizing that goes into campaigns tends to have staying power, which is important because the fight against PV takes time. For example, perpetrators of PV may try to rewrite history and reframe events even years after they happen in an attempt to inhibit outrage. Campaigns that result in an organized community presence to commemorate anniversaries of events, and draw attention to victories or injustices, is part of ensuring that hard-fought gains are not reversed.
Principle 5: Resist
When you begin to publicly mobilize against perpetrators of political violence, you may think of your efforts as standing up for your rights, supporting common social norms and values, and protecting victims and your larger community. However, those who perpetrate political violence may perceive your actions as escalating the conflict.
This is especially common when the status quo enables perpetrators of political violence to operate with impunity, which is largely the case in the US for inciters and threat-makers. A backfire campaign disrupts this status quo. It is unexpected. It will be seen as a threat by those who seek to bully and silence communities.
In the face of this challenge, perpetrators are likely to go to the playbook that they know best, which is to double down and engage in further incitement and threats. Disinformation and attacks on people’s reputations may be part of these attacks as well. This combination of incitement and disinformation can also lead to an increase in physical political violence, although thus far such physical attacks are relatively rare. Some perpetrators (especially inciters who have significant financial resources) may also threaten defamation lawsuits or other legal claims that have little or no chance of succeeding. The goals of such tactics are simple: to stop the backfire efforts and spread fear. They want to deter onlookers from joining backfire campaigns or from seeking to start new campaigns in other communities.
Another tactic that perpetrators may try to use are rewards, such as bribes (or campaign contributions), for those who stay silent. While financial inducements of this sort may be less likely than threats or incitement in the context of PV, it is still worth watching out for them. In addition, the concept of offering rewards goes beyond offering money. A reward is already implicit in the threats of perpetrators—they are communicating that the “reward” for those who stay silent is that they will be left alone. This is a form of political extortion that must be firmly called out and rejected—the price of a peaceful life must not be civic disengagement and coerced abandonment of one’s constitutional rights to free speech and free assembly.
Anticipating these kinds of threats and attacks, what can groups do to resist them? Answering this question involves identifying two key tests that organizers will face, as well as some factors that can help them pass these tests.
Test 1: Solidarity
Solidarity is one of the most important attributes of an effective backfire campaign. When people stand together, they are strong. For this reason, it is critical that groups agree to support each other if any member of the group is attacked. When perpetrators scare and isolate us, we lose. When we stand together, we win. There are many more of us than there are of them.
Therefore, one of the first tests faced by a backfire campaign is when perpetrators try to break solidarity among a campaign’s supporters. They are likely to single out and escalate threats and harassment on a small number of individuals or organizations. When they start to do this, the broader community will look at what happens in response. If the perpetrators’ threats succeed in demobilizing people, it sends a powerful message to the community that the backfire campaign is not strong enough to win. This then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as potential supporters begin to hesitate in joining the campaign, while inciters and threat-makers feel emboldened to increase their activity.
On the other hand, a well-prepared campaign can cause new threats to backfire. For example, when a campaign organizer or ally is threatened, people rally to their aid. When a business is threatened, it gets more patrons. When a politician is threatened, they get more donations and volunteers. When an activist is threatened, they get more community support. This kind of solidarity can also create a self-fulfilling prophecy. It shifts the entire psychology of the conflict, as well as perceptions about which side is stronger.
The importance of solidarity has significant implications for planning. It means at minimum that organizers should develop strong ties with allies before public mobilization so that it is easier to make possible future threats against the campaign backfire. It also means that once a campaign has begun, it has to be resilient enough to withstand possible threats and intimidation and continue to pursue its goals.
Test 2: Remaining Nonviolent
The second test is what happens when a campaign is provoked or attacked. Can the campaign remain nonviolent and maintain communications that reach out to the broader public and undercut violent extremist narratives?
Provocations are tough to resist. A single cowardly act of violence against an unarmed protester can activate outrage and underlying trauma, especially if there is video evidence of the attack. Highly inflammatory and degrading rhetoric playing on racism, sexism, or other forms of prejudice can also cause activists to feel that this gives them permission to respond with reciprocal rhetoric.
Yet if activists succumb to provocations, they may significantly increase their own risk of suffering physical violence. Simultaneously, they may alienate potential allies and reinforce mobilization by perpetrators. In other words, when activists engage in violence, or highly inflammatory rhetoric, it tends to decrease backfire against perpetrators of PV and instead backfires against the activists themselves. Some may argue that this is unfair, but that does not make it untrue.
Here is evidence of what’s at stake. Acts of physical political violence seem to, at least temporarily, increase the enthusiasm of those who support extremist groups or PV. For example, research by the organization Moonshot, which aims to counter violent extremism, found that in the week after the 2017 violent white nationalist Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, there were:
Five times as many “searches indicating a desire to get involved with violent groups.” This included 220 times as many “searches indicating a desire to donate to the Ku Klux Klan” and nine times as many “searches indicating attempts to join the Ku Klux Klan.”
Three times as many “searches indicating a desire to kill ethnic minorities.” This included 19 times as many “searches indicating a desire to kill Jewish Americans” and a 40 percent increase in “searching indicating a desire to kill Black Americans.”⁵⁶
Responding to such dynamics with violence likely only makes them much worse. In contrast, fostering backfire holds great potential to shift these dynamics over the medium- and long-term. The revulsion that large segments of the broader population feel toward political violence can fuel mobilization that imposes costs on perpetrators, while also driving greater support to those who oppose PV—including activists, candidates, organizations, public officials, civil servants, and certain businesses.
A resulting decline in political violence may not happen overnight. A period of time will likely have to pass before inciters and threat-makers realize that their tactics will continue to backfire and that they will continue to lose. However, once they understand this, their cost-benefit calculus will shift. Democratic norms of political activity will be strengthened and greater deterrence will be achieved.
Assessing and Mitigating Risk
One of the best ways to build a resilient campaign is to prepare for contingencies ahead of time. Opposing political violence can feel intimidating. Fear and anxiety can cloud our decision making, so it’s important to assess the likelihood of several kinds of risks, and the potential to mitigate them. Some considerations are below.
Physical Political Violence
Physical political violence remains relatively rare in the US, and many threat-makers do not carry through on their threats. It’s one thing for an individual to sit behind a computer and send anonymous threat messages. It’s a very different thing for an individual to take the time to plan an act of physical political violence and then to risk their life, livelihood, and a long prison sentence by carrying it out. In addition, many inciters and threat-makers understand that acts of physical political violence are more likely to backfire against their broader cause as well.
However, we do not know what the future will bring. If numerous backfire campaigns around the US start to challenge PV, the chance that those campaigns will be met by physical political violence may temporarily increase. Although physical political violence may remain unlikely against any specific campaign, the chance of an act of physical political violence happening at some point to some campaign seems likely.
Even if the risk remains small, the consequences of physical political violence can be major, which means it is important to address how this risk can be mitigated.
There are a number of options. First, individuals can engage in low-risk tactics and take roles that minimize their potential exposure to physical political violence. Low-risk tactics can still be very powerful. For example, if thousands or millions of people donate money, engage in boycotts, register to vote, send messages of support to victims, or volunteer for political candidates, it can make a big difference. There are also many important behind-the-scenes roles in any campaign, including helping with research, logistics, and other administrative and technical functions.
Second, campaigns can carefully craft messaging and choose goals that make physical political violence more likely to backfire. A campaign with goals and framing that have widespread support and are anchored in widely shared community values may cause some proponents of political violence to think twice about the costs and benefits of their possible actions.
Third, campaigns can reach out to potential allies that may help deter or diffuse violence. Such allies may range from religious groups, to legal support groups, to law enforcement.
Fourth, campaigns can invest heavily in training, especially for individuals who may take roles that expose them to the risk of physical violence. Training can engage one’s cognition as well as emotions, so that people are psychologically prepared to respond strategically to actions taken against them. For example, in some cases, perpetrators may try to instigate confrontations with activists so that the perpetrators can then use violence as supposedly justified self-defense and claim legal protection under “stand your ground” laws. For campaigns engaged in public mobilization, being prepared for such behavior is important. Activists can also train on de-escalation techniques and practice them.⁵⁷ They may also want to deploy or request the help of peace teams to reduce the risk of violent conflict.⁵⁸ In addition, knowing the relevant laws and circumstances under which to contact law enforcement, and developing protocols around doing so, can be critically important.
Threats, Harassment, and Disinformation
Threats, harassment, and disinformation are a more likely response to backfire campaigns than acts of physical political violence. These activities can create genuine psychological harm to individuals and their families. In addition, threat-makers and purveyors of disinformation may also try to damage the reputations of individuals and put pressure on their employers to end their employment. They may further try to hurt the reputation of businesses and deny them customers.
Understanding these risks, it is important to be prepared to rally behind threatened individuals and provide psychological, social, and sometimes economic support. Doing this can be a form of backfire. For example, showing that threatened individuals will receive more public support or higher visibility (if they want such visibility), or that threatened businesses will get more customers, can have a powerful effect.
Additional considerations include allying with groups that can offer online security training to prevent hacking and defend against online harassment, as well as legal support for those who are targeted. Such training can be helpful even before threats are received. Individuals should be well-versed in relevant laws, the importance of documentation, and the possibilities of bringing defamation lawsuits against perpetrators, or alerting authorities to possible criminal violations.
Lawsuits
In some cases, activists who call attention to certain facts about a powerful individual or entity could face SLAPP lawsuits (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation). SLAPP suits accuse activists of violations such as “defamation, nuisance, interference with contract, interference with economic advantage, or invasion of privacy,” but they are meritless and simply designed to drain resources from defendants and to intimidate onlookers.⁵⁹ Thus, they have a similar impact to political violence, because they tend to make people afraid to exercise their constitutional rights of freedom of speech or to petition for a redress of grievances.
One essential preparation to mitigate the risk of SLAPP suits (as well as legitimate claims of defamation) is to ensure that all information that your campaign releases is factual.⁶⁰
Attorneys can offer legal advice and education on how to characterize facts and opinions, and may be willing to provide pro bono guidance to activists on mitigating the risk of defamation and SLAPP suits. Over 30 states and Washington, DC, have adopted anti-SLAPP laws to help defendants quickly have these spurious lawsuits dismissed.⁶¹ Building relationships with and consulting attorneys can both reduce the risk of these lawsuits, and help activists and campaigns respond to them if they are accused.
When to Turn to Government and Law Enforcement
Activists who are facing threats of PV will have differing perspectives on when and how to engage government and law enforcement. Some activists feel comfortable engaging with law enforcement and building relationships, while others may feel unsafe around law enforcement. Some may find that a visible presence by law enforcement at public actions makes them feel reassured, while others may be concerned that such a presence could cause people to hesitate to join a particular public action.
There is no perfect answer to address these considerations. However, regardless of your position, it is important to understand various aspects of government—especially the relevant federal, state, and local laws that apply to your backfire efforts. These are addressed in greater detail in Part IV.
In addition, knowing which institutions within government handle various aspects of PV is also important. For example, the US Department of Justice has divisions that focus on protecting elections. The FBI plays a role in countering online threats. Local police have different training and focus. In some cases it may make sense to work with one institution of government more than another. If you choose to proactively build relationships with such government entities, appointing liaisons from your group and establishing clear points of contact and protocols for possible incident responses can be helpful.
Footnotes
³¹ For some ideas on group formation, see Hold the Line: A Guide to Defending Democracy. It addresses forming local election protection teams and offers potential team meeting agendas on pages 23-37. You can apply some of the same ideas to forming a team for a backfire campaign.
³² For example, a number of organizations have released resources that offer policy and practical recommendations to counter PV, and these are listed in Part IV of this guide. However, some people in government positions or other roles in society may not always feel personally comfortable voicing loud advocacy for various policies, even if they strongly support them.
³³ Martin, Backfire Manual, 69-71.
³⁴ The roles of inciters, threat-makers, and enactors in perpetrating political violence are outlined in the Appendix.
³⁵ These five audience segments are based on the Spectrum of Allies strategic planning tool. For more information, see: “Spectrum of Allies,” 350.org. https://trainings.350.org/resource/spectrum-of-allies/.
Analyzing these five audience segments can be useful in developing narratives, communications, and actions. However, as you consider which groups fall into which of these five categories, it is also important to remember that there can also be significant variation within groups. Most groups are not monolithic. For example, while most members of a particular organization may be neutral, some may be passive allies, while others may be passive opponents.
³⁶ There are many valuable initiatives to depolarize US society right now, to foster dialogue across political differences, and to moderate political extremism. These are important efforts, but they are different than trying to make political violence backfire. However, both methodologies (backfire and bridge-building) can be complementary and play a role in reducing support for political violence.
³⁷ “A Refresher on Narratives & Violence,” Over Zero. https://www.projectoverzero.org/media-and-publications/a-refresher-on-narratives-and-violence.
³⁸ Over Zero, A Refresher on Narratives & Violence.
³⁹ Over Zero, A Refresher on Narratives & Violence.
⁴⁰ This list is based on (with slight modifications) Martin, Backfire Manual, 83-84.
⁴¹ Psychological support may happen through private conversations, but it can also be through public acts and displays of solidarity and support. One example to draw from may be anti-cyberbullying campaigns on social media, such as the “I Am A Witness” campaign. Targeted at teens, it included public service announcements by social media influencers directing their audiences to a campaign website that provided actions that people can take, as well as the use of a hashtag and campaign emoji to show solidarity.
⁴² There are many ways in which disinformation can be countered, and research highlights different practices to do so. One promising option is “prebunking,” which means proactively trying to raise an audience’s awareness of arguments, falsehoods, and tactics that might be used to deceive them. More information about prebunking, and steps on how to do it, see Laura Garcia, “A Guide to Prebunking: A Promising Way to Inoculate Against Misinformation,” First Draft, September 2, 2022.
For a broader analysis of a variety of ways to counter misinformation, see Jon Bateman and Dean Jackson, Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-Based Policy Guide (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024).
⁴³ Chloé Lauvergnier, “German Neo-Nazis Tricked into Fundraising for Anti-Nazi Charity,” France 24, November 20, 2014.
⁴⁴ Moises Velasquez-Manoff, “How to Make Fun of Nazis,” The New York Times, August 17, 2017.
⁴⁵ Sarah Freeman-Woolpert, “Why Nazis Are So Afraid of These Clowns,” Waging Nonviolence, August 25, 2017.
⁴⁶ Brandy Zadrozny, “Oklahoma Official with White Nationalist Ties is Ousted in Recall Vote,” NBC News, April 2, 2024.
⁴⁷ Anne Helen Peterson, “Love Lives in Whitefish, Montana, But So Do Neo-Nazis,” BuzzFeed News, February 12, 2017.
⁴⁸ Seaborn Larson, “Whitefish Celebrates “Love Lives Here,” Great Falls Tribune, January 16, 2017.
⁴⁹ An example of movement and organizing principles that can form a basis for a code of conduct is found in: Merriman, et al., Hold the Line: A Guide to Defending Democracy, 25-27.
⁵⁰ Jordi Muñoz and Eva Anduiza, “‘If a Fight Starts, Watch the Crowd’: The Effect of Violence on Popular Support for Social Movements,” Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 4 (2019): 485–498.
⁵¹ Omar Wasow, “Agenda Seeding: How 1960s Black Protests Moved Elites, Public Opinion and Voting,” American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (2020): 638–659.
⁵² Some of the common elements of dilemma actions can be found here: Srdja Popovic with Sophia A. McClennen, “Core Components of Dilemma Actions,” Pranksters vs. Autocrats: Why Dilemma Actions Advance Nonviolent Activism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020); Sørensen, Majken Jul, and Brian Martin. “The Dilemma Action: Analysis of an Activist Technique.” Peace & Change 39, no. 1 (January 2014).
⁵³ For a 25-minute documentary film synopsis of the Nashville campaign, see: “Nashville: We Were Warriors,” A Force More Powerful, directed by Steve York (1999).
⁵⁴ Jonathan Sutton, Charles R. Butcher, and Isak Svensson, “Explaining Political Jiu-Jitsu: Institution-Building and the Outcomes of Regime Violence Against Unarmed Protests,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 5 (2014): 559–573.
⁵⁵ Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson, “Explaining Political Jiu-Jitsu.”
⁵⁶ Moonshot, “Charlottesville: The Aftermath,” Infographic.
⁵⁷ Resources on de-escalation can be found in Part IV.
⁵⁸ For an example of peace team guidelines, see: Portland Peace Team, “Portland Peace Team Protocols.”
⁵⁹ Dennis Hetzel and Brandi M. Snow, “SLAPP Suits,” Free Speech Center, September 11, 2023.
⁶⁰ Robert Rafii, Esq., “Libel, Slander, and Defamation Law: The Basics,” FindLaw, August 17, 2023.
⁶¹ Hetzel and Snow, “SLAPP Suits.”