Part II: Making Political Violence Backfire: Five Principles
The United States is full of different values, views, and preferences, but hundreds of millions of us agree that democracy—and not political violence—is how we resolve our disputes.²² The power of our vast majority comes from acting together. We must push back against efforts by a small segment of the population that wants to use political violence to seize power, silence dissent, violate constitutional rights, and prevent fellow citizens and community members from engaging in civic life.
Standing up against these bullies may seem risky. Yet consider the alternative—civic disengagement because of apathy or fear, and assuming that political violence is someone else’s responsibility (i.e., government officials and law enforcement) to solve. Such a choice practically guarantees that political violence will get worse and that our democracy will continue toward breakdown.
Thus, we are at a crossroads, and there’s little need to guess where each road leads. Our history is a clear guide. The US has a long record of threats and violence being used to restrict the franchise, suppress dissent, and invoke fear and terror. For example, this was the glue that held together Jim Crow and single-party white rule, particularly in the US South. Left unchecked, this kind of toxic mix threatens to move our nation to a time where we may still have elections, but fear of PV is widespread and our rights are not respected. In such a country, independent journalists would be persecuted, legislative and judicial branches would be subverted, and rule of law would be further eroded from corruption, bias, and threats.
Conversely, in US history, democratic progress has been achieved when thousands or millions of people across the country have organized together, exercised their rights of free speech and assembly, participated in elections, and ensured that abusive powerholders are held accountable. This has happened in spite of intimidation and political violence—for example during the women's suffrage movement, the labor rights movement, and the Civil Rights movement.
“The path we choose will determine whether the current trend of political violence and intimidation fades or gives way to something even more sinister. Our democracy’s health and our nation’s stability depend on our collective response to this dangerous turn.”
This choice to stand up is deeply personal, and once we make that decision, we have to figure out how best to advance our goal and what roles each of us can play. Some people may have free time, political experience, and a high tolerance for risk. Others may feel stretched thin—with little time, risk tolerance, or confidence that they can make a difference. Yet people in both of these circumstances can contribute and are needed. This guide exists to help generate options for community members with various backgrounds, skills, and resources to coordinate their efforts into a common strategy to make political violence backfire. There is a role for everyone.
THE BACKFIRE MODEL
The primary strategy outlined in this guide is based on the “backfire” model. The goal of this model is to make sure that when any kind of political violence takes place, perpetrators face high costs for their actions. When their actions are counterproductive for them, their actions can be said to backfire.
The costs imposed on perpetrators can take two forms. First, there are direct losses to perpetrators—including a loss of political support, a loss of social standing, economic losses, and in some cases being held legally accountable. Second, there is increasing support, power, and mobilization by those who oppose political violence—for example by rallying around people who are targeted by political violence, engaging in greater voter registration and turnout, pushing for new laws to be passed and enforced, and supporting many other efforts that run counter to the goals of the perpetrators.
An advantage of the backfire approach is that it provides both offensive and defensive options. Through undermining perpetrators and simultaneously strengthening groups targeted by PV, it can shift incentives so that political violence is no longer profitable for individuals and groups. Once the threat of political violence is seen as a political, economic, social, or legal liability, it becomes much easier to deter.
The backfire model is based on research done by scholar Brian Martin and others, and much of the content in this section draws from their work.²³ Martin and others have examined instances around the world in which a wide range of abuses (especially those involving violence) backfired, as well as instances where they did not. Over time, Martin identified five methods that perpetrators rely on to try to inhibit outrage and minimize backfire against injustice. These methods are:
Cover-up – Hide the unjust actions, deny they ever happened, and prevent word from spreading about them.
Devaluation – Try to lower the social standing of the target.
Reinterpretation – Attempt to downplay the amount of damage caused by the injustice, portray the injustice as unavoidable or for a greater good, and/or deflect blame to others.
Official channels – Set up inquiries and investigations that move slowly, limit public visibility or input, rely on technical rules, and provide only the appearance of justice.
Intimidation and rewards – Threaten people who may speak out against injustice, and reward people for remaining silent.²⁴
Often these methods are effective at preventing or reducing backfire. However, sometimes the perpetrators’ tactics fail, and backfire occurs. When it does, it is often because people relied on five principles (which can be remembered as the “5 Rs” below) to heighten outrage and increase mobilization against injustice. These principles are:
Reveal – Expose the injustice.
Redeem – Validate the target.
Reframe – Interpret the event as an injustice.
Redirect – Mobilize support and avoid official channels.
Resist – Resist intimidation and bribes.²⁵
Each of these principles is discussed in general below. Then in the following chapter they are applied to the specific problem of political violence in the US.
Reveal: Countering Cover-Up
The first tactic of abusers is to try to cover up injustice. They claim that the injustice didn’t happen, or seek to reduce distribution of news about the injustice. Sometimes those who have suffered may also contribute to the cover up by refusing to speak up or share information about the injustice publicly. While this can be frustrating, people who have suffered abuse may have significant fear about being targeted further if they step forward, speak openly, or share evidence.
Yet in order for injustice to backfire, it must be revealed. The methods used to do this will depend on specific circumstances—for example, in some cases, revealing can happen through research and other forms of evidence gathering, or through detailed interviews with people who have suffered abuse (and whose consent should be secured before sharing this information more widely). Sometimes activists can also create conditions where cover-up of a potential abuse is more challenging, such as when activists all carry cameras and plan ahead for sustained documentation of public actions, which alerts possible perpetrators in advance that they will be recorded.
Once verified evidence is available, however, it must also be presented in a way that seems credible, and distributed. What is perceived as credible depends on the audience—some audiences are interested in data. Some are interested in stories. Some will find evidence more credible if presented by a person of a certain background or profession, or through a certain kind of media outlet.
In addition, the timing and manner in which activists reveal injustice matters. For example, revealing threats or violent incidents without advance planning may inadvertently increase public fear and decrease the potential for mobilization, which makes backfire less likely. However, with advance planning, activists can reveal evidence of threats or violence while simultaneously showing determination to stand up to the perpetrators, alongside a specific call to action for community members.
Redeem: Countering Devaluation
Devaluation is “lowering the status or opinion of a person or object” with the goal of making violence or other abuse toward them seem more acceptable.²⁶ Perpetrators attempt to devalue the people they abuse through a variety of means, including by sharing (directly or through rumors) damaging information—which may be false—about a person who was abused. They may also label a person as a terrorist, criminal, or political extremist. In doing so, they often play to prejudices that are present in society, such as attitudes of racism and sexism.
Perpetrators may further try to provoke a targeted person into saying or doing things that can be used against them. For example, by taunting people, hurling deeply offensive insults, or attacking them physically in hopes of creating a counterattack, perpetrators may attempt to create an incident that helps them further devalue those they abuse.
The counter-tactic to this is to humanize (redeem) those who have been abused and to reduce the social distance between them and the broader audience. Humanizing people, providing context and details about their lives, elevating their positive values (which they may share with the broader audience) and actions, and having others (especially those in roles that the audience trusts and respects) speak up on their behalf can all help to counter devaluation. Photos and video may be very helpful to communicate this as well.
In addition, advance training and adopting a code of conduct (which is addressed further in Part III of this guide) for political activities can be helpful in inoculating targeted individuals from being provoked by perpetrators.
In general, it is important to anticipate devaluation attempts and be prepared to address them quickly through any or all of the following: facts and evidence, counter-attacking perpetrators, using humor, and relying on trusted intermediaries.
Reframe: Countering Reinterpretation by Perpetrators
Alongside devaluation, abusers will attempt to reinterpret an incident to make it seem like their abuse did not do much damage (minimizing), was necessary for the greater good (framing), or was not their fault at all (blaming). Sometimes outright lying about various details is also part of their repertoire.²⁷
As an example, during its global war on terror, the United States used numerous tactics of torture.²⁸ In an attempt to minimize outrage against these techniques, US officials referred to these as “enhanced interrogation” tactics rather than torture (minimizing). They further claimed that these tactics were legal and necessary (framing), even though torture has a poor record of producing reliable and credible information. When evidence emerged that US guards tortured prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, investigations were launched. Senior officials blamed soldiers at the prison for the abuse (blaming), while soldiers claimed that they were following orders and/or that their superiors were aware of the abuse. Yet no senior US officials were ultimately charged.
Similarly, after incidents of police brutality are uncovered, police departments may claim that the brutality was not that severe, that police were simply doing their jobs and ensuring public order, and that any police abuse was solely the result of misjudgments by the police present and not indicative of any systemic problems in the police department. In response to further pressure, they may also offer to conduct an internal investigation of the matter.
Countering these efforts requires reframing. Documentation about the impact of and damage from the abuse can help neutralize the perpetrators’ narratives. Communicating why the abuse was not justified and why it violates laws or widely held values is also vital. Communicating who should be held accountable for the abuse (for example, reframing abuse from an individual problem to a systemic problem) is also important. Weaving these aspects together into clear narratives and choosing trusted messengers to deliver these narratives can further increase impact. It is important to remember that while an injustice may seem obvious to activists, it should never be assumed that it is obvious to other audiences. Therefore, activists must put facts into context by developing narratives that show the moral outrage of an abuse and mobilize a broader constituency to get off the sidelines.
Since perpetrators almost always attempt to reinterpret their abuse, it is also important to anticipate this tactic and be prepared to quickly counter it.
Redirect: Not Relying on Official Channels to Deliver Justice
When efforts to cover up, devalue, and reinterpret fail, perpetrators try to divert action into official channels such as an investigation or inquiry. These institutional processes have many varieties: Some are internal (such as a government agency investigating their own employee) while others are independent. Some are closed-door while others may be covered live by media outlets. They also often have technical rules about who is allowed to testify or offer information, and how that information is considered. Perpetrators prefer inquiries that are internal and closed-door. However, even public and independent investigations can still result in decreased public mobilization. This is because they tend to work slowly, focus on technical procedures, rely on experts, and give an appearance that justice will be done.²⁹ Therefore, relying on them can drain grassroots energy. Moreover, once people are demobilized, inquiries may become less aggressive in pursuing the truth.
In the face of such institutional processes, activists have many options, including supporting the process, criticizing the process, making demands of the process, launching their own parallel process, or using the institutional process as a campaigning tactic.³⁰ However, the key point to remember is that activists must not rely solely on the process to deliver justice. Instead, they must continue to redirect public outrage toward mobilization. The issue must remain alive among members of the public, so that those who oppose injustice continue to build their strength and exert ongoing pressure.
Resist: Standing Firm Against Intimidation and Bribery
A final tactic used by perpetrators to try to inhibit public concern is to threaten those who speak out or organize against injustice. They may also try to bribe, reward, or otherwise co-opt people into remaining silent or demobilizing. This may extend beyond just targeted activists—sometimes perpetrators may further try to silence activists’ family, friends, and colleagues.
Yet, threats and attempts to reward silence are risky for perpetrators, because activists who resist them can also turn these actions into catalysts for more backfire. As with other backfire tactics, preparation here is key. Anticipating intimidation and rewards, activists can warn their friends, families, and colleagues of such efforts, prepare to document these efforts, and develop strategies to make them backfire if or when they happen. Furthermore, being public about the fact that a group is prepared for threats may actually have a deterrent effect on perpetrators, making them aware ahead of time that such tactics will be used against them in “the court of public opinion,” and possibly also even a court of law.
The backfire model outlined above is designed as a tool to help community members and activists. It is based on tried-and-true principles that have been applied in a variety of cases around the world. The model can be quite useful in coordinating and organizing campaigns to counter abuse, and it can further help people anticipate the kinds of actions that perpetrators will take.
However, the model is also not a formula, and it can’t tell people exactly what to do. For example, it doesn’t address what specific tactics people should take in a given circumstance (for example, holding a press conference, launching a social media campaign, protesting, lobbying politicians, launching a boycott, or various forms of labor or school strikes). It also doesn’t provide answers about what specific demands or goals people should make when they employ backfire methods.
Part of why the model doesn’t directly address these issues is because every circumstance is different, and local activists and community members will have the best knowledge of their particular context, and thus the particular options that make the most sense for them.
This guide can’t specifically answer questions for every context, but in the following chapter, we will share some considerations about applying these principles in the US against political violence.
Footnotes
²² For more information on percentages of Americans that oppose or support political violence, see the Appendix.
²³ Martin and others have written extensively about backfire. For a list of writings on this subject, see: Brian Martin, “Backfire Materials.”
²⁴ Brian Martin, Backfire Manual: Tactics Against Injustice (Sparsnäs: Irene Publishing, 2012), 8-10.
²⁵ Martin, Backfire Manual, 10-12.
²⁶ Martin, 24.
²⁷ Martin, 26-28.
²⁸ Reed Brody, Getting Away with Torture: The Bush Administration and Mistreatment of Detainees (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 2011).
²⁹ Martin, 29-31.
³⁰ Martin, 83-84.